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The aims of our Target Review (Lehmann & Keller, 2006)
were to develop a simple model allowing us to delineate
the conditions necessary for cooperation and altruism to
evolve and argue that the models proposed so far can all
be classified into four general categories depending on
the selective forces at work. These are direct benefits to
the Focal Individual (FI) performing a cooperative act,
repeated interactions with direct or indirect information
on the behaviour of the partner in previous moves,
preferential interactions between related individuals and/
or a linkage disequilibrium between genes coding for
altruism and phenotypic traits that lead to assortment of
individuals bearing altruistic genes (i.e. greenbeard
effect). We were extremely pleased to see that authors
of 14 of the 15 Commentaries found our framework
useful and generally endorsed our views. Doebeli &
Fletcher (2006) were the only authors who fundamen-
tally disagreed with our classification. However, their
criticisms mostly stem from a misunderstanding of our
model and kin selection theory.
Several Commentaries raised similar general issues, in
particular about the assumptions of our model and/or
alleged limitations of Hamilton’s rule. We therefore
address these comments in the first four general sections.
Following these, we address the criticisms raised by
Fletcher and Doebeli (2006). Finally, in the two last
sections, we discuss all the other specific comments raised
in the Commentaries, and finish with a short conclusion.
Genetic assumption of our model
Queller & Strassmann (2006) pointed out that our model
lacks rigour because it is ‘built on principles of optimality
and inclusive fitness rather than being based directly on
gene frequencies’. Doebeli & Fletcher (2006) also
suggested that ‘we adjust the meaning of the fitness
costs and benefits to highlight what we believe is
fundamental’. Both these assertions are incorrect. Under
the demographic conditions specified in the main text of
our Target Review, and assuming an additive effects of
genes underlying the level of helping, it is possible to
express the change in allele frequency (p) over one
generation of a mutant whose phenotype deviates only
slightly (weak selection) from the phenotype expressed
by a resident allele as:
Dp ¼ rb cð Þpð1 pÞ: ð1Þ
(Rousset, 2004, pp. 108–109 and pp. 206–207). Accord-
ing to this equation, the direction of selection on the
mutant allele is positive at all allele frequencies when:
rb ) c > 0, where )c is the effect of a FI expressing the
mutant genotype on its fitness, b is the effect of a partner
bearing the mutant genotype on the FI’s fitness and r is
the genetic relatedness between the FI and its partner,
which is evaluated in the absence of selection. Fitness, as
specified in our Target Review, measures the expected
number of offspring of a FI that reach adulthood, which
is strictly equivalent to the definition of fitness given by
Hamilton (1964). In other words, we derived Hamilton’s
rule from a population genetic model, classified behav-
iours as altruistic or cooperative as Hamilton did, and
never modified the meaning of the cost ()c) and benefits
(b) throughout the paper [see also Grafen’s (2006)
comments on this].
Demographic assumptions of our model
For the sake of simplicity, we only presented in the main
text of our Target Review a simple social situation where
interactions occurred between pairs of individuals in a
large population of constant size. We also assumed that
this population included only two kin classes and used
Hamilton’s rule to determine the direction of selection on
the helping allele. In the Appendix, we considered other
situations such as a spatially structured population with
overlapping generations or with an explicit demography
where helping can effect patch size. These examples were
chosen to illustrate that our conclusions are robust to
variation in demographic structure. However, van Baalen
& Jansen (2006), Wild & Taylor (2006), Wenseleers
(2006) suggested that there are demographic structures
other than those that we considered. Although it is true
that there are an infinity of demographic structures, such
variations do not affect our conclusion that one of our
four conditions needs to be fulfilled for cooperation or
altruism to be selected for because the selective pressure
on helping can always be broken down into direct and
indirect effects of actors on the fitness of a FI. Indeed,
when the type of social interaction is more complex than
just pairwise interactions and/or involve several classes of
actors (e.g. males and females, or several age classes)
and/or if the population is geographically structured or of
variable size, it is possible to express the change in allele
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frequency, as we originally detailed in the supplementary
material of our Target Review, as:
Dp ¼ DWIFpð1 pÞ; ð2Þ
where DWIF is again a measure determining the direction
of selection at any allele frequency under weak selection
(Rousset, 2004; Rousset & Ronce, 2004). When the
population is of finite size, DWIF determines the effect of
selection on the probability of fixation of the mutant
allele (Rousset, 2004). The measure of selection DWIF,
which is a weighted sum of the effects of all individuals in
the population on the fitness of individuals bearing the
mutant allele, fits with Hamilton’s definition of inclusive
fitness effect (Hamilton, 1964). In this case, the weights
are the coefficients of relatedness between a FI bearing
the mutant allele and the individuals affecting its fitness,
the reproductive values of the FI’s offspring and the
frequencies of the various classes of individuals affecting
the fitness of the FI. The inclusive fitness effect DWIF can
be interpreted as a generalization of the simple inclusive
fitness effect (rb ) c) used in the Target Review and
reveals that the different selective forces (e.g. differential
effects due to males and females and/or patch demogra-
phy) influencing helping can always be broken down
into direct and indirect effects on the FI’s fitness. In other
words, the incorporation of more complex life-histories
does not change the general nature of the selective forces
acting on helping, which can only evolve when at least
one of our four conditions is fulfilled.
Strong selection, nonadditive gene
effects and multilocus evolution
Several authors (Fletcher & Doebeli, 2006; Doebeli &
Hauert, 2006; Queller & Strassmann, 2006; Wenseleers,
2006) pointed out that Hamilton’s rule fails to provide
the correct direction of selection on helping when there
is strong selection and/or non-additive gene effects. In
such situations selection is frequency dependent (e.g.
Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1978; Michod, 1982; Roze &
Rousset, 2004). However, we shall show here that our
conclusions are not affected by assuming more complex
genetic underpinning of helping (for increased generality
we also discuss the issue of multilocus evolution). Let us
assume that genes at several positions in the genome
affect the direct fitness of a FI and let designate by S these
positions [a position is a locus in a particular context (see
Kirkpatrick et al., 2002, Fig. 1), for instance the place in
the genome where the FI’s helping genes reside or the
place where the helping genes of a FI’s relative reside].
The change in frequency p of a helping allele at a given
locus can be expressed as:
Dp ¼
X
US
aUDU ; ð3Þ
where aU is the intensity of selection on the helping allele
resulting from the expression of the genes in the set of
positions U [these positions can be in the FI’s genome
and/or in the genome(s) one or several other individu-
als], DU is the genetic association between the genes in U
and the genes residing at the helping locus of the FI, and
the sum runs over all possible subsets of positions that
can be constituted with the set of positions S (Kirkpatrick
et al., 2002). Inspection of Eqn 3 reveals that the
selective pressure on a helping allele consists of (1)
phenotypic effects of a set of genes (one or several genes
residing in the FI and/or in different individuals) on the
fitness of the FI and (2) genetic associations (covariance
in the case of pairs of genes) between the genes affecting
the FI’s fitness and the genes at the FI’s helping locus (see
Appendix for an explicit example). Effects of genes on
the FI’s fitness and associations between genes can be
evaluated to various orders of magnitude of phenotypic
effects. These include first order effects (linear), second
order effects (quadratic) or higher order effects. For
instance, the effects of actors on fitness in Hamilton’s rule
are traditionally evaluated to first order phenotypic
effects whereas relatedness is evaluated to the zero’s
order (i.e. in the absence of selection). But nothing
prevents the evaluation of effects of actors on fitness to
second order phenotypic effects and relatedness to the
first order. That Hamilton’s rule is evaluated to the lowest
order only is not a weakness of inclusive fitness theory
but of our own inability to exactly evaluate the direction
of selection. Equation 3 also reveals that it is always
possible to decompose the selective forces acting on
helping into two categories, whatever the mode of gene
action, intensity of selection, and number of loci affecting
the FI’s fitness. The first category consists in all effects
dependent on the FI expressing its own genotype. These
‘direct effects’ can be conditional on whether the part-
ners express genotypes identical to that of the FI at a
given locus (which may be the basis of synergy for
instance). The second category are indirect effects on
the FI’s fitness, which result from the expression of the
genotype(s) of partner(s) and are unconditional on the
FI’s genotype. Because the selective pressure on helping
can always be decomposed into direct and indirect effects
of actors on the FI’s fitness, we conclude that whatever
the complexity of the genetic basis of helping, cooper-
ation and altruism can evolve only when at least one of
our four conditions is fulfilled.
ESS conditions and evolutionary
branching
Doebeli & Hauert (2006) suggested that our classification
is not applicable in cases where a population resides at an
evolutionary branching point and that Hamilton’s rule
cannot be used at such points. In order to see why this is
not true, we first explain how game theory relates to the
inclusive fitness theory presented above.
Hamilton’s rule, and more generally the inclusive
fitness effect DWIF, allows us to determine whether a
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mutant helping allele will be selected for when rare and
to establish the direction of selection at all gene
frequencies under weak selection and additive gene
effects (eqn 2). The inclusive fitness effect also allows us
to locate candidate evolutionary stable strategies (ESS),
which are found at the points where it is equal to zero
(Day & Taylor, 1998; Rousset, 2004). The inclusive
fitness effect further allows us to determine whether
such a candidate ESS is convergence stable (i.e. an
evolutionary attractor). However, the inclusive fitness
effect DWIF in itself does not allow us to determine
whether a candidate ESS actually is an ESS (i.e. a final
stop of evolution for the helping trait). The reason is that
the inclusive fitness effect given in eqn 1 or eqn 2 is
evaluated to the first order of phenotypic effects on
fitness and is thus only a linear approximation of the
selective pressure on the helping allele that neglects
higher order effects. At an ESS point, the linear effects on
fitness cancel each other so that quadratic effects can be
used as the new approximation for determining the
selective pressure on helping. After convergence to a
candidate ESS, the further development of the evolu-
tionary process can be determined by a weighted sum of
the expected effects of all individuals in the population
on the fitness of a FI bearing the mutant allele, where
such effects on fitness are quadratic (Day, 2001; Ajar,
2003) and provide a good approximation under weak
selection (Rousset, 2004). These effects can be fully
interpreted in terms of inclusive fitness theory (Ajar,
2003, eqns 29–30), because they involve direct and
indirect effects of the partners on the fitness of the FI of
the same kind as the selection coefficient aU in eqn 3. It is
true that inclusive fitness effects do not allow us to
predict what type of mutant will invade the population at
a branching point. Whether it is a more or less cooper-
ative mutant than the resident genotype that will appear
depends on the type of mutations that occurred. How-
ever, at a branching point, no mutant allele can invade a
resident allele unless it results in a greater inclusive
fitness effect, hence implying that one of four conditions
needs to be satisfied for the invasion of a mutant allele at
a branching point.
Synergism and discrete/pure strategies
Several Commentaries raised the point that our model
does not incorporate synergistic effects and that this is a
problem with our classification because such effects are
inherently frequency dependent (Doebeli & Hauert,
2006; Queller & Strassmann, 2006; Wenseleers, 2006).
Although we did not discuss in details situations with
synergetic effect we specified in the section direct
benefits of our Target Review that ‘the value of f will
also depend on the behaviour of other group members
when there are synergistic effects of cooperation’. The
example of synergism that we had in mind was a
situation where the synergistic benefit of helping for a
FI was proportional to the product of its own investment
and that of its partner. Consider for instance a one shot
and random interaction between pairs of individuals in
the same demographic setting as described in our Target
Review (i.e. x ¼ 0 and x ¼ 0), where investment into
helping results in a linear cost C for a FI bearing the
helping allele, a benefit D to each partner increasing
linearly with the product of the investment into helping
of both the FI and its partner. Under such a situation,
helping will spread when the inequality:
Ds C > 0 ð4Þ
is satisfied. In other words, helping is cooperative because
the action (conditional on the action of the partner)
results in increased fitness for both the FI (by Ds ) C) and
its partner (by Ds). In fact, this in eqn 4 for the evolution
of helping is very similar to in eqn 6 in our Target Review
and inspection of in eqn 4 reveals that when nobody
in the population expresses helping in the first place
(s ¼ 0), investment into helping cannot be selected for
and thus relies on kin selection for its initial emergence.
The same conclusion was reached for the initial evolution
of helping under repeated interactions (see eqn 18 of the
supplementary material of the Target Review).
In our Target Review we did not consider the situation
where helping is determined by discrete (or pure)
strategies. In that case, the condition for the evolution
of helping under synergistic effects is no longer given by
eqn 4, yet it can be integrated in our framework.
Consider the situation given in Wenseleers (2006) where
an act of helping results in a cost C to a FI bearing the
helping allele and in a benefit D to each partner when
both the FI and its partner bear the helping allele.
Assuming the same life-cycle as described in the main
text of the Target Review, we find from eqn 3 and eqn 15
in the Appendix that the change in frequency p of the
helping allele is positive when:
Dp C > 0: ð5Þ
In other words, helping becomes a better strategy than
the alternate option of defecting if the frequency of
helpers in the population times the synergistic benefit
exceeds the cost of helping. This condition of invasion is
very similar to that in eqn 4 with the frequency of
helpers p in the population playing the same role as the
level of investment into helping f of an individual
sampled at random from the population in the continu-
ous helping strategy setup. And in the same way as in the
continuous strategy case, helping is again cooperative
because the act of helping results in an increase in fitness
for both the FI (by Dp ) C) and its partner (by Dp).
Moreover, as in the continuous strategy situation, a
positive relatedness between interacting individuals is
required for helping to be selected for when helpers are
initially rare in the population (p ﬁ 0).
In conclusion, these analyses reveal that when indi-
viduals are not preferentially interacting with individuals
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with above average relatedness, synergistic helping fall
into our category of ‘direct benefits’ because an act of
helping can evolve only when translating into increased
direct fitness. Modelling synergistic effects can be readily
done for situations of repeated interactions and nonran-
dom interactions between kin classes in the population
when helping. For example, we derive in the Appendix a
model where helping is a discrete strategy in a structured
population. Importantly, however, the occurrence of
synergism does not alter our point that at least one of our
four conditions need to be satisfied for helping to be
selected for.
Markets and partner choice
Several authors mentioned that we did not include the
possibility of partner choice (Queller & Strassmann,
2006; Sachs, 2006), partner fidelity (Sachs, 2006) nor
the possibility to terminate an interaction as a response to
defection (Cant, 2006; Hammerstein & Leimar, 2006).
This is correct and was done on purpose because these
are all additional factors that can promote cooperation
only if one of our four general conditions is met. The
most common of these conditions is repeated interactions
between individuals with direct or indirect information
on the behaviour of the partner in the previous move(s).
In that case it is correct that partner choice, partner
fidelity and the possibility to terminate an interaction are
potent mechanisms that will increase the probability that
cooperative individuals preferentially interact with each
other. Such effects could readily be integrated in the
model presented in the main text of our Target Review
by adding a new parameter quantifying the decreased
likelihood of a cooperative individual engaging in an
interaction with an individual that was previously not
cooperative. This could be done for a situation where
helping is a continuous strategy, as in the model in our
Target Review, or a discrete strategy as discussed above
for situation of synergism.
Partner choice, partner fidelity and the possibility to
terminate an interaction as a response to defection could
also play a role when information on whether a given
individual is likely to be cooperative comes from reputa-
tion. As shown in the Appendix of our Target Review, this
situation can be modelled in a similar manner to recip-
rocal altruism and, in this case, it would also be possible to
add a new parameter quantifying the decreased likelihood
of a cooperative individual to engage in an interaction
with an individual that was previously uncooperative.
Finally, one could also imagine that partner fidelity and
the possibility to terminate an interaction as a response to
defection could also play a role if individuals can assess
the cooperative tendency of other individuals on the basis
of a phenotypic or behavioural trait.
In conclusion, we agree that partner choice, partner
fidelity and the possibility to terminate an interaction as a
response to defection are important mechanisms that
may promote cooperation and/or altruism. However, for
these mechanisms to operate requires that at least one of
four conditions is fulfilled.
Response to Fletcher and Doebeli
There is, unfortunately, much confusion in Fletcher &
Doebeli’s (2006) Commentary. Nevertheless, wewelcome
the opportunity to respond to their Commentary because
it allows us to address common mistakes also made by a
few other theoreticians who, unfortunately, have never
made the effort to understand kin selection theory nor to
familiarize themselves with the rich literature on this
topic. Readers at ease with kin selection theory may want
to skip this section.
We shall start by addressing four simple misunder-
standings. First, F&D assert that we only used the most
basic meaning of r (i.e. relatedness by descent). This is
not correct as we also consider probabilities of identity in
state of which identity by descent is only a particular
case. Secondly, F&D assert that we modify the meaning
of b and c. Unfortunately no specific equation is given.
We strictly used Hamilton’s (1964, 1970) definitions of
fitness costs and benefits. As, Grafen (2006) pointed out:
‘Lehmann and Keller rightly recognize that the b and c to
be used in Hamilton’s rule need to be appropriately
derived’. Thirdly, F&D state that we implement a pop-
ulation-wide definition of altruism that leads to very
unsatisfactory results in our classification. We do not
know what F&D mean by a ‘population-wide definition
of altruism’. In any case, our definition is strictly
equivalent to the definition of altruism given by Ham-
ilton (1964, 1970) and there is a large literature justifying
the use of such a definition (e.g. Grafen, 1985; Frank,
1998; Rousset, 2004). Finally, F&D provide a long
discussion on the direct and inclusive fitness approaches.
We are not clear what F&D wanted to state and refer
readers to excellent discussions of Frank (1998) and
Rousset (2004) on this issue. Importantly, our model is
derived from a rigorous population genetic framework,
and for simplicity, we either interpret our results by
looking at the effect of a FI on the fitness of all members
of the population (inclusive fitness approach) or by
looking at the effect of all individuals in the population
on the FI’s fitness (direct fitness approach). Both
approaches are perfectly correct and can be used inter-
changeably (Rousset, 2004, pp. 107–108). In the same
section F&D also criticize Sachs et al. (2004) treatment of
kin selection which, they suggest, ‘confounds an
accounting technique with a mechanism’. The strength
of inclusive fitness theory is precisely that it provides
both an accounting technique and a mechanism to
explain the evolution of social behaviours. The treatment
of kin selection theory of Sachs et al. (2004) is correct in
our view.
Fletcher and Doebeli claim that the distinction
between ‘weak altruism’, where the actor obtains a
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benefit from its own act of helping (i.e. )c > 0 in eqn 1),
and ‘strong altruism’ where there are no such direct
benefits (i.e. )c < 0) is not fundamental. On the contrary,
the vast majority of researchers interested in the natural
phenomenon of cooperation and altruism, starting with
Darwin himself, and including all the other authors who
expressed their view on this matter in their Commen-
taries, understand that there is a fundamental distinction
between ‘weak altruism’ and ‘strong altruism’ (see e.g.
Ratnieks, 2006).
Fletcher and Doebeli assert that our framework tends
to obscure the fundamental roles that assortment and
nonadditivity play. This is a perplexing statement. Three
of our categories are explicitly based on assortment. For
example, in the conclusion of our Target Review, we
stated that ‘cooperation and altruism can evolve only
when there are direct benefits to the FI performing a
cooperative act, repeated interactions with direct or
indirect information on the behaviour of the partner in
previous moves, preferential interactions between rela-
ted individuals and/or a linkage disequilibrium between
genes coding for altruism and phenotypic traits that can
be identified. In the three later cases helping evolves
because there is a positive association between individ-
uals at the genotypic and/or phenotypic levels’. More-
over, throughout the paper, and in all equations, we
make clear that positive assortment is critical when there
are no direct benefits.
Fletcher and Doebeli claim that when nonadditivity is
present, altruistic behaviour can evolve even in the
absence of positive assortment. This is wrong. Synergism
can lead to cooperation without positive assortment but
not to altruism (see the Synergism and discrete/pure
strategies section).
Finally, F&D consider three models that they claim do
not fit in our classification framework. The first is the
grouping model of Avile´s (2002) where grouping and
cooperation are modelled as distinct co-evolving traits. In
this model it is assumed that the fitness of an individual
in a group increases with the number of helpers in the
group raised to the power of some constant and decreases
exponentially with the total number of individuals in a
group. An analysis of the model reveals cycles in the level
of helping with mutants having both a grouping and
cooperative tendency being selected for when the pop-
ulation mostly consist in individuals with nongrouping
tendencies. The dynamics of this model is very similar to
Jansen & van Baalen’s (2006) model. In both cases,
frequency-dependent selection leads to variation over
time in the level of altruism, the oscillations depending
on the mutation rate. The model of Avile´s (2002) is thus
a special case of ‘green beard’ model as we correctly
classified in the Table of our Target Review. Moreover,
contrary to what is stated by F&D, synergy is probably
not important. Although it is true that the model assumes
that the fitness of an individual depends on the number
of helpers in the group raised to the power of some
constant (called synergy by F&D), the crucial assump-
tions of the model are that loners perform better when
groups consist of defectors and the fitness of a helper
increases with the number of helpers in its group. This
situation can also occur when the fitness of individuals
increases additively with the number of individuals
within groups.
The second model is the so-called environmental
feedback model by Pepper & Smuts (2002). In this model
the authors consider two classes of individuals that feed
on patches of plants that they leave when resources are
depleted. The two classes are unrestrained eaters that
quickly deplete local resources and restrained eaters,
which depletes resources less quickly. Their model shows
a positive assortment between unrestrained and
restrained eaters but it does not investigate whether
feeding restraint is a stable strategy in the population. In
other words, although the simulations of Pepper & Smuts
(2002) provide interesting information on possible
mechanisms promoting positive assortment, they do not
allow us to make any conclusion on the evolution of
cooperation and altruism.
The third model is by Fletcher & Zwick (2004). F&D
claim that this model provides an example where
altruism can evolve between nonrelatives. An analysis
of their model provides a perfect example of the contrary.
The model by Fletcher & Zwick (2004) is a slightly
different form of the group-selection model studied by
Hamilton (1975) where individuals interact in randomly
formed groups, except that several generations of repro-
duction occur before the stages of complete dispersal,
regulation and formation of new groups. Such a life-cycle
results in individuals of the same gene lineage interacting
with each other and thus benefiting from the altruism of
kin descending from the same parents. In the Appendix
we show that helping cannot evolve if interactions
between kin are prevented to occur. In conclusion, the
model of Fletcher & Zwick (2004) falls perfectly into our
classification scheme and provides a nice example of a
failure to recognize kin selection.
Response to the other issues raised in the
Commentaries
Queller & Strassmann (2006) suggested that one of their
own models (Queller, 1992) already encompassed all the
relevant forces presented in our model. This is correct.
However, Queller’s (1992) model does not partition the
selective forces in terms of direct and indirect effects on
fitness and does not distinguish between cooperation and
altruism. Thus, althoughwe agree that it is a useful model,
it is not appropriate for establishing a simple classification
of models of cooperation and altruism. The same com-
ment holds for the group selection approach and multi-
level selection models mentioned by Foster (2006).
Wenseleers (2006) raised concerns about possible
limitations of Hamilton’s rule under frequency depend-
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ence which we addressed in the section Strong selection,
nonadditive gene effects and multilocus evolution. Using
eqn 3, we also present in the Appendix a model that
allows us to show, in contrast to Wenseleers’ (2006)
suggestions, that cooperation in spatial game can be
explained in terms of kin selection and that introducing
discrete strategies does not limit the application of
inclusive fitness theory.
Doebeli & Hauert (2006) listed two examples of
situations that they claim do not fit in our framework.
The first, taken from Hauert & Doebeli (2004) and is a
situation where a FI investing x into helping plays with an
individual investing y into helping. The fecundity of the
FI is given by B(x + y) ) C(x), where B and C are
monotonously increasing benefit and cost functions.
Thus, the gradient of selection on helping is given by
B¢(2x) ) C¢(x), where the primes denote derivatives.
Accordingly, helping spreads when B¢(2x) ) C¢(x) > 0.
From this Doebeli & Hauert (2006) conclude that ‘con-
trary to what seems to be implied in Lehmann and Keller,
whether individuals receive net direct benefits from the
act of cooperation is not determinant of whether cooper-
ation is favoured’. This is an odd statement because it is
completely contradicted by the analyses of the gradient of
selection. Indeed, B¢(2x) is the marginal benefit of an
individual investing into helping and C¢(x) is its marginal
cost. Thus, B¢(2x) ) C¢(x) represents the net effect of a FI
on its fitness when increasing investment into helping,
which precisely corresponds to )c in Hamilton’s rule
(eqn 1). When there are not direct benefits of helping,
namely B¢(2x) ¼ 0, helping is counter-selected ()c < 0).
Doebeli & Hauert (2006) thus provide a perfect example
of a situation where helping spreads because it increases
the FI’s fitness. This example thus falls neatly into our
category of direct benefits. In fact, that individuals should
behave cooperatively under such situations has been
recognized long ago as exemplified by the following quote
by Adam Smith (1776): ‘It is not from the benevolence of
the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our
dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We
address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-
love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of
their advantages’.
Doebeli & Hauert (2006) also claim that the various
formalizations of the evolution of altruism in ‘spatial
structuring models’ of Nowak & May (1992), Killingback
et al. (1999), Hauert & Doebeli (2004) do not fall into one
of our categories as spatial structure promote cooperation
because it leads to a positive assortment between
cooperators. As explained in length in our Target Review
these three models fall into our category kin selection. A
good introduction to the topic of how spatial structure
can promote the evolution of altruism by kin selection is
given by Hamilton (1971).
van Baalen & Jansen (2006) were worried that we did
not make sufficiently clear how kin selection relates to
kin recognition and that our approach may perpetuate
the misconception that kin selection requires discrimina-
tion of related individuals. We hope that our Target
Review does not lead to such a misunderstanding. In the
Target Review’s Appendix we derived several models
where kin selection can operate under some specific
demographic situation without kin recognition. There are
many other such situations (e.g. van Baalen & Rand,
1998; Taylor & Irwin, 2000; Lehmann et al., 2006). van
Baalen & Jansen (2006) also suggested that our model
creates the impression that the costs, benefits and the
relatedness structure are static properties of a popula-
tions. Although it is true that this was the case in the
simple model presented in the main text, we also
presented in the Appendix models where relatedness is
a dynamical variable depending on population demogra-
phy and where helping itself can affect the demography
of the population. Finally, van Baalen & Jansen (2006)
mention that, contrary to what we stated, greenbeard
mechanisms are not inheritantly unstable. Here we shall
acknowledge that we were somewhat imprecise by
failing to explicitly stipulate the conditions under which
greenbeard mechanisms are unstable. The situation that
we had in mind was the simple case where evolution
occurs in a panmictic population with interactions
occurring between individuals that do not share any
recent common ancestry. However, it is true that
common descent in geographically structured population
can counteract the erosion of linkage between a helping
allele and a recognition allele, eventually leading to a
stable level of altruism by a greenbeard effect (Axelrod
et al., 2004; Jansen & van Baalen, 2006).
Cant (2006) was concerned that we might have
underestimated the role of punishment. In particular he
pointed out that the option to terminate an interaction as
a response to defection can be a powerful force favouring
the spread of cooperation mutants in a noncooperative
population. We agree that this can be a potent factor and
have now discussed this issue in the Markets and partner
choice section. As we made clear, the option of termin-
ating an interaction as a response to defection, which can
be classified in the category of reciprocity with direct or
indirect information, may indeed play an important role
when cooperation is established. However, the option to
terminate an interaction as a response to defection
cannot in itself help to promote cooperation in a
noncooperative population.
Hammerstein & Leimar (2006) mentioned other inter-
esting situations of cooperation, but these were mostly
between species or between organelles. Although a
framework similar to the one we developed could be
used for interespecific interactions, we decided to con-
centrate on intraspecific interactions to avoid confusions.
In their other Commentary, Leimar & Hammerstein
(2006) provide an interesting historical view of the field
of cooperation making the valid point that, unfortu-
nately, there is a significant amount of models that are
driven by their own properties rather than the aim to
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understand cooperation and altruism in nature. This,
together with the fact that a significant number of
theoreticians fail to incorporate their work in a more
general context of previously published work, was
indeed the main reason that prompted us to write our
Target Review. We hope that this debate will help gifted
theoreticians to develop models aiming at understanding
puzzling phenomena in nature rather than studying
what Leimar & Hammerstein (2006) appropriately call
‘highly stylized situations’. In their Commentary these
authors also point out that we did not consider cultural
evolution in our framework. Cultural evolution is
undoubtedly an important mechanism allowing the
transfer of information in humans, and as such, it plays
a pivotal role in the evolution of cooperation and
altruism (e.g. Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Boyd &
Richerson, 1985). However, it should in principle always
be possible to decompose the selective forces acting on
cultural variants expressing helping according to an
equation of the form of eqn 3. Accordingly, we are not
aware of any model of cultural evolution, which cannot
be classified into our four general categories.
Boyd (2006) correctly pointed out that even if the
necessary conditions that we outlined for the evolution
of cooperation under repeated interactions are satisfied
this does not mean that reciprocity is an ESS. Boyd
provides a clear explanation of why this may not be the
case and we have nothing to add.
Sachs (2006) provides a detailed and very balanced
discussion of the linked with other previously proposed
frameworks. The only point meriting a remark is partner
choice. For partner choice to select for cooperation
requires that individuals can assess the cooperative
tendencies of their partner hence leading to assortment
between cooperative individuals. Hence, partner choice
also requires information. Such information can come by
several means, the most common in nature probably
being repeated interactions (see Sachs et al., 2004) for a
detailed account of the many mechanisms that may
allow one or several of our four conditions to be
fulfilled).
Ratnieks (2006) makes several valuable comments on
our framework and, contrary to Doebeli & Fletcher
(2006), he feels that it is important to distinguish
between ‘weak altruism’ and ‘strong altruism’ because
these are biologically two very different situations. We
fully agree with Ratnieks that weak altruism is a bad term
as weak altruists, on average, enhance direct reproduc-
tion. This is why we use the term cooperation for acts
that increase the fitness of the FI and its partner.
As stated by Michod & Herron (2006), our framework
can also be useful to classify the forces involved in the
evolution of individuality. However, there might be
limitations, in particular when the transition involves
partners of different species.
Grafen (2006) pointed out that introducing the
parameter f to describe the fraction of benefit that return
to the FI is unnecessarily complex because the net effect
of an individual expressing helping on its fecundity is
sufficiently described by a single parameter. The reason
we introduced the parameter f was to illustrate that
helping can be selected for because it results in a direct
fitness benefit for a FI, without necessarily eliciting a
cooperative response of the partner. This parameter can
be useful to understand the selective forces, for example
in the case given in Doebeli & Hauert (2006) that we
discussed above. Grafen also expressed concerns about
our claim that phenotype matching leads to uniform
genetic similarity over the whole genome. While
describing phenotype matching, we stated that: ‘Since
common genealogy generates phenotypic similarity for
genetically determined traits, each trait can be used as an
independent value to estimate average genetic identity.
This is a process of statistical inference with arbitrary
phenotypic traits being used as quantitative or qualitative
variables. Importantly, both spatial recognition and
phenotype matching lead to uniform genetic similarity
over the whole genome’. What we meant by the later
phrase is that if individuals sample a very large number
of independent phenotypic traits in other individuals to
estimate their genetic similarity with them, then the
estimate of similarity is an indicator of average related-
ness over the whole genome because common ancestry
generates similarity between individuals at all loci. But
we acknowledge that our statement was confusing and
we wish to make clear that we where not stating that the
evolutionary consequences of phenotype matching
results in uniform genetic similarity. Although the
evolution of recognitions systems and the consequence
for the maintenance of genetic variability at matching
loci is extremely complex and has to our knowledge not
been fully worked out, we agree that kinship is probably
the only biological factor that can produce uniform
genetic similarity across the genome. Finally, Grafen also
mentioned that contrary to what we asserted, green-
beards are not necessarily unstable. This is a valid point
that we addressed in our response to van Baalen &
Jansen (2006).
Conclusion
In this response we hope that we clarified issues that
were not clear in our Target Review and addressed the
many interesting points raised in the 15 Commentaries.
In particular, we showed that our framework and
classification are based on a population genetic model
which does not depend on particular assumptions about
the population structure and genetic underpinning of
helping behaviour and that synergic effects can readily be
incorporated in our model. Our classification is thus
based on a robust framework allowing one to identity the
conditions necessary for the evolution of cooperation and
altruism. Clarifying the relationship between models and
correctly classifying different situations belonging to the
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same mechanism should facilitate communication, avoid
duplication and focus the attention of theoreticians on
biologically relevant phenomena.
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Appendix
In this Appendix we derive two different population
genetic models where evolution occurs in a spatially
structured population. First, we present a model where
helping is a discrete strategy, which can result in
synergistic effects. This model allows us to illustrate that
contrary to what is asserted by Wenseleers (2006),
cooperation in spatial game can be explained in terms
of kin selection and that introducing discrete strategies
does not limit the application of inclusive fitness theory.
Then, we demonstrate that helping evolves in the model
of Fletcher & Zwick (2004) by kin selection. We first
present the general life-cycle, which is common to both
models and then consider each specific case in turn. To
derive these models we follow the direct fitness approach
developed by Roze & Rousset (2005).
Life-cycle
Let us posit that evolution occurs in a population
following Wright’s infinite island model of dispersal.
Individuals are haploid and live in demes where they
have only one neighbour. Events of the life-cycle occur
in the following order. (1) A one shot social interaction
occurs between the two individuals living in a deme. (2)
Each individual produces a very large number of juve-
niles and dies. (3) Each juvenile disperses independently
from each other with probability m to another deme. (4)
Regulation occurs with the effect that only two juveniles
reach adulthood in each deme.
We consider a two allele model (say A and a) and
assume that the fecundity of an individual depends on its
own genotype and on the genotype of its partner. The
change in frequency p of a helping allele A over one
generation in the population can be written as:
Dp ¼ Ei;j wijfðijÞ
 
; ð6Þ
where wij is the expected number of adult offspring of
individual j breeding in deme i and f(ij) ¼ p(ij) ) p is a
centred variable with p(ij) designating the frequency (0 or
1) of allele A in that individual. The expectation in the
equation for gene frequency change is taken over all
individuals and all demes. The fitness of individual j in
deme i depends on both its expected number of offspring
reaching adulthood in deme i and on those reaching
adulthood in other demes after dispersing. These two
fitness components depend on fecundity that will be
written under the form 1 + dfij, where 1 is the baseline
reproductive unit and fij is the phenotypic effect on the
fecundity of individual j in deme i of the expressions of
the genotype of that individual and the genotype of its
neighbour. Accordingly, the fitness of individual j in
deme i can be written as:
wij ¼ ð1mÞð1þ dfijÞð1mÞð1þ dfiÞ þmð1þ df Þ þ
mð1þ dfijÞ
ð1þ df Þ ; ð7Þ
where fi is the effect of actors on the average fecundity of
individuals in the focal deme and f is the effect of actors
in the population on the average fecundity of individuals
in other demes. Assuming weak selection (small d), the
change in frequency of allele A is given to the first order
in d by:
Dp ¼ dEi;j fij  ð1mÞ2fi mð2mÞf
 
fðijÞ
 þOðd2Þ; ð8Þ
where O(d2) is a remainder involving second and higher
order terms.
Synergy
Let us denote by C the direct fecundity cost of bearing the
helping allele, B the benefit of helping received by a
neighbour bearing the helping allele and D the synergis-
tic effect on the fecundity of each individual when both
individual in a deme bear the helping allele. Under such
conditions, the phenotypic effect of the genotypes of the
two individuals in a deme on the fecundity of individual j
in deme i is:
fij ¼ CpðijÞ þ BpðikÞ þ DpðijÞpðikÞ ð9Þ
where p(ik) is the frequency (0 or 1) of allele A in the
individual j’ neighbour in deme i (labelled here individ-
ual k). The effect of actors in deme i on the average
fecundity of the two individuals in that deme is:
fi ¼ 1
2
fij þ 1
2
fik ð10Þ
and the effect of actors on the average fecundity of
individuals in different demes is:
f ¼ 1
nd
Xnd1
h;h6¼i
fh ð11Þ
where there is an infinite number of demes (nd ﬁ ¥).
Following Kirkpatrick et al. (2002) and Roze & Rousset
(2005), we express all the gene frequencies appearing in
the fecundities given above in terms of centred variables
(p(ij) ¼ p + f(ij)). The effect of actors on the fecundity of
individual j in deme i becomes:
fij ¼ ðB CÞpþ Dp2 þ ðDp CÞfðijÞ þ ðBþ DpÞfðikÞ
þ DfðijÞfðikÞ: ð12Þ
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By expressing similarly fi and f in terms of centred
variables and substituting into eqn 8, we eliminate
variables with repeated indices with the formula
f2ðijÞ ¼ pð1 pÞ þ fðijÞð1 2pÞ (Kirkpatrick et al., 2002).
By using Ei,j[f(ij)] ¼ 0, Ei,j[f(ij)f(hk)] ¼ 0 and
Ei,j[f(ij)f(hj)] ¼ 0 for all individuals from deme h different
than i because individuals from different demes are
unrelated and using Ei,j[f(ij)f(ik)] ¼ p(1 ) p)r for individ-
uals from the same deme, where the coefficient of
relatedness r is given here by Wright’s measure of
population structure (r ¼ FST), we find that the change
in gene frequency reads:
Dp ¼ pð1 pÞ C þ Br þ Dðr þ ð1 rÞpÞ½
 ð1mÞ2fðB CÞ ð1þ rÞ
2
þ Dðr þ ð1 rÞpÞg

:
ð13Þ
The term in square brackets in this equation is the
effect of all actors in a focal deme on the fitness of a FI
bearing the helping allele. This effect on direct fitness is
made of four different terms. First, the direct cost (C)
resulting from the FI expressing helping. Secondly, the
benefit B received by the FI from its neighbour, which is
weighted by the relatedness r between actor and recipi-
ent. Thirdly, the synergistic effect D of helping which
depends on the probability r + (1 ) r)p that the neigh-
bour of the FI also bears the helping allele. Fourthly, the
increase in kin competition in the focal deme, which
depends on the probability (1 ) m)2 that a FI’s offspring
compete against another juvenile produced in the focal
deme. This increase in kin competition depends on the
increase of the number of juveniles produced in the focal
as a result of the FI and its partner helping each other
(effect of intensity (B ) C)(1 + r)/2) and as a result of the
synergistic effect of helping on individual fecundity
[effect of intensity D(r + (1 ) r)p)].
Inserting the equilibrium value of relatedness r ¼
FST ¼ (1 ) m)2/(1+2m)m2), we find that all terms invol-
ving the benefit B cancel each other out, which is
consistent with the results of Taylor (1992) and all our
results given in the supplementary material of our Target
Review when evolution occurs in a spatially structured
population. Notice that the selective pressure for the
Prisoner’s dilemma (or repeated Prisoner’s dilemma) can
be found by substituting C ” (S)P), B ” (T)P) and
D ” P+R)S)T into eqn 2, where the payoffs are the so-
called reward for mutual cooperation (R), temptation to
defect (R), sucker’s payoff (R) and punishment for mutual
defection (P).
When the helping allele is rare (p ﬁ 0), the net effect
of the FI on its fitness is given by:
c ¼ C þ Dr  ð1mÞ2 ðB CÞ
2
þ Dr
 
; ð14Þ
which gathers all effects on fitness resulting from the FI
expressing the helping genotype (such effects involve the
effects that are conditional on whether the partner also
expresses the helping genotype). Thus, the net direct
effect on fitness depends on the cost C of expressing
helping, the benefit B resulting from helping neighbours
and the synergistic benefit of helping D, which is
weighted by the coefficient of relatedness r.
When evolution occurs in a family structured popula-
tion (e.g. interactions between siblings) and when there
is no kin competition, the change in gene frequency
(eqn 13) is given by:
Dp ¼ pð1 pÞðC þ Br þ Dfr þ ð1 rÞpgÞ; ð15Þ
which provides the same equilibrium frequency of the
helping allele as obtained by Wenseleers (2006) and
presented by his eqn A.8.
Fletcher and Zwick’s altruism
The model analysed by Fletcher & Zwick (2004) is
equivalent to the model studied by Hamilton (1975)
except that several generations of reproduction occur
before the stages of complete dispersal, regulation and
formation of new groups. For simplicity, and without loss
of generality, we investigate here analytically only the
situation where there are only two individuals per group
and only two successive events of reproduction before
dispersal. The dynamics of the two phases of reproduction
within groups is modelled by following the equations
presented in Appendix A of Fletcher & Zwick (2004).
However, we evaluate here the change in frequency of the
helping allele with eqn 6, where wij is the fitness function
giving the expected number of individuals in the lineage
of individual j in deme i reaching adulthood after two
events of reproduction (here m¼1 in eqn 7 because
dispersal is complete). The expected number of offspring
descending from individual j in group i after two gener-
ations of reproductions can then be written as:
fij ¼ 1þ B
ð1þ BpðikÞ  CÞpðijÞ
2
þ ð1þ BpðijÞ  CÞpðikÞ
2
	 
CpðijÞ
 ð1þ BpðikÞ  CpðijÞÞ; ð16Þ
where p(ij) designates the frequency (0 or 1) of allele A in
individual j of group i and in its offspring. The frequency
(0 or 1) of allele A in the neighbour and in the offspring
of the neighbour of individual j of group i is designated
by p(ik). The second line of eqn 16 represents the number
of offspring produced by individual j in group i. This
value depends on the cost of helping C and on the benefit
B that individual j in group i receives from its group mate.
The first line in eqn 16 represents the number of
offspring produced by the offspring of individual j in
group i. This number depends on the cost of helping and
on the benefit received by offspring of individual j in
group i, which depends on the average number of
altruists in the group after the first period of reproduc-
tion. Accordingly, the offspring of individual j in group i
may receive benefits from siblings and from the offspring
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of the neighbour of individual j in group i. Since dispersal
is complete, there is no relatedness between the two
individuals initiating a group and the relatedness r
between two offspring descending from the same mother
(or the relatedness between mother and offspring) is
equal to one given that individuals are haploid. We
rewrite eqn 16 in terms of centred variables and substi-
tute it into eqn 8 and set m ¼ 1. Taking the expectation
over all groups in the population and individuals within
groups we have Ei,j[f(ik)f(ij)] ¼ 0, because dispersal is
complete, Ei,j[f(ij)f(hk)]¼0 and Ei,j[f(ij)f(hj)] ¼ 0 for all
individuals from group h different than i because indi-
viduals from different groups are unrelated and
Ei,j[f(ij)f(ij)] ¼ p(1)p)r by our definition of relatedness.
We find that the change in gene frequency is given by:
Dp ¼ pð1 pÞ Cð1þ pfB ð1þ BÞC þ B2pgÞ
þ rð1 C þ pfB CgÞ 1
2
fBð1 CÞ  2Cg þ pB2
 
;
ð17Þ
where the first term in the square brackets is the effect of
helping of a FI of the parental generation on its fitness.
The second line of this equation is the effect of the
offspring bearing the parental gene lineage on the fitness
of the focal parent. If the relatedness between two
offspring descending from the same parent were equal to
zero (r ¼ 0), the direction of selection on the helping
allele is negative at all gene frequencies. However,
because this relatedness is equal to one (r ¼ 1) in the
model of Fletcher & Zwick (2004), the change in gene
frequency can be positive and is given by:
Dp ¼ pð1 pÞ  Bð1 CÞ
2
2
 Cð2 CÞ
"
þpBð3B 3ð1þ BÞC þ C2 þ 2pB2Þ: ð18Þ
When the helping allele is rare (p ﬁ 0), helping
spreads when:
Bð1 CÞ2
2
> Cð2 CÞ ð19Þ
is satisfied. Helping spreads when helping results in a
direct fitness benefit for the focal gene lineage. Thus,
Doebeli & Fletcher (2006) are wrong when they assert
that helping spreads in the model of Fletcher & Zwick
(2004) for a reason that is not accounted by our
framework. If one conducts an analysis of the selective
pressure on helping [which Fletcher & Zwick (2004) do
not do], it appears that helping evolves by kin selection
in the model of Fletcher & Zwick (2004), hence proving
that it is valuable to try to understand models within the
framework given in our Target Review.
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